Market structure, scrappage, and moral hazard

被引：2
|
作者：
Esteban, S [1 ]
Llobet, G [1 ]
机构：
[1] Penn State Univ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2005年 / 88卷 / 02期
关键词：
monopoly; moral hazard; scrappage; maintenance; durability;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.019
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with an option to buy. This contract is optimal regardless of the monopolist's ability to commit and creates inefficient scrappage. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：203 / 208
页数：6
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