Empirical tests for ex post moral hazard in a market for automobile insurance

被引:0
|
作者
Rowell, David [1 ]
Nghiem, Son [2 ,3 ]
Connelly, Luke B. [1 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Queensland, Ctr Business & Econ Hlth CBEH, Brisbane, Qld 4067, Australia
[2] Griffith Univ, Ctr Appl Hlth Econ, Brisbane, Qld 4111, Australia
[3] Griffith Univ, Sch Med & Dent, Brisbane, Qld 4111, Australia
[4] Univ Bologna, Dept Sociol & Business Law, I-40126 Bologna, BO, Italy
关键词
Ex post moral hazard; Automobile insurance; Road traffic crash repairs; ECONOMICS; FRAUD;
D O I
10.1017/S1748499521000191
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Ex post moral hazard arises when the insured has an unobservable influence on the size of a loss after its occurrence. In automobile (property) insurance, ex post moral hazard could increase in the scope of the repairs and/or the value of the repairs. Both vehicle owners and auto repairers could gain from increasing the scope of repairs, while auto repairers would gain from an increase in the value of repairs. An analysis of 994 Australian road traffic crashes found that ex post moral hazard increased the value of repairs by 46.8 per cent of which 9 percentage points was explained by an increase in the scope of the repairs, which was defined as an increased from 2 to 2.4 parts per auto repair.
引用
收藏
页码:243 / 260
页数:18
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