Dispersed initial ownership and the efficiency of the stock market under moral hazard

被引：1
|
作者：
Calcagno, R
Wagner, W
机构：
[1] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[2] Tilburg Univ, Dept Finance, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[3] Univ Cambridge, CERF, Cambridge, England
来源：
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 42卷 / 01期
关键词：
stock market equilibrium; moral hazard; general equilibrium; constrained optimality;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.11.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We generalize a standard general equilibrium framework extended for moral hazard to allow for a dispersed initial ownership distribution of firms. We show that the market allocation is constrained-efficient only when in each firm the entrepreneur who generates payoffs through unobservable effort has full initial ownership in his firm. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：36 / 45
页数：10
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