Market structure, scrappage, and moral hazard

被引：2
|
作者：
Esteban, S [1 ]
Llobet, G [1 ]
机构：
[1] Penn State Univ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2005年 / 88卷 / 02期
关键词：
monopoly; moral hazard; scrappage; maintenance; durability;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.019
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In the presence of moral hazard, the optimal contract for a durable-goods monopolist is a lease with an option to buy. This contract is optimal regardless of the monopolist's ability to commit and creates inefficient scrappage. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：203 / 208
页数：6
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