Economic studies of adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance market

被引:0
|
作者
Xing, Liqing [1 ]
Sun, Shaorong [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Shanghai Sci & Technol, Sch Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China
关键词
adverse selection; insurance fraud (moral hazard); insurance market;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In insurance market, the two problems of adverse selection and moral hazard such as insurance fraud have damaged badly the normal operation and healthy development of insurance industry. The interrelation of insurance fraud and adverse selection was analyzed in the paper by applying the correlative knowledge of game theory and information economics. And it is indicated that insurance fraud will lead to the increase of insurance premium and further bring the adverse selection under the information asymmetry. At a result, the point of the problem lies in how to curtail the occurrence and development of insurance fraud. Finally the corresponding measures were advanced for preventing and punishing the insurance fraud.
引用
收藏
页码:2443 / 2451
页数:9
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