Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

被引：0
|
作者：
Hans K. Hvide
Tore E. Leite
机构：
[1] University of Aberdeen Business School,
[2] CEPR,undefined
[3] IZA,undefined
[4] Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration,undefined
来源：
Economic Theory | 2010年 / 44卷
关键词：
Costly state verification; Debt contract; Priority violation; Strategic defaults; D02; D82; G21; G3;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We consider a financing game where monitoring is costly, non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. The optimal contract, which is debt, induces creditor leniency and strategic defaults on the equilibrium path, consistent with empirical evidence on repayment and monitoring behavior in credit markets. Our paper is the first where the optimal contract is debt and default is not synonymous with bankruptcy.
引用
收藏
页码：149 / 165
页数：16
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] Presidential address, committing to commit: Short-term debt when enforcement is costly
    Diamond, DW
    JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2004, 59 (04): : 1447 - 1479
  • [32] Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable: A comment
    Sharma, T
    ECONOMETRICA, 2003, 71 (01) : 387 - 390
  • [33] Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable: A reply
    Krasa, S
    Villamil, AP
    ECONOMETRICA, 2003, 71 (01) : 391 - 393
  • [34] Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification
    Hau, Arthur
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL, 2008, 32 (05): : 1680 - 1700
  • [35] The collateral channel under imperfect debt enforcement
    Beutler, Toni
    Grobety, Mathieu
    EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2019, 111 : 336 - 359
  • [36] Optimal debt contracts and the single-crossing condition
    Faure-Grimaud, A
    Mariotti, T
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1999, 65 (01) : 85 - 89
  • [37] Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers and Public Debt Policy
    Hiroshi Fujiki
    Hiroshi Osano
    Hirofumi Uchida
    The Japanese Economic Review, 2004, 55 : 372 - 400
  • [38] Optimal contracts for central bankers and public debt policy
    Fujiki, H
    Osano, H
    Uchida, H
    JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2004, 55 (04) : 372 - 400
  • [39] Neural basis of increased costly norm enforcement under adversity
    Wu, Yan
    Yu, Hongbo
    Shen, Bo
    Yu, Rongjun
    Zhou, Zhiheng
    Zhang, Guoping
    Jiang, Yushi
    Zhou, Xiaolin
    SOCIAL COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE, 2014, 9 (12) : 1862 - 1871
  • [40] The Regulatory Strategy in Emissions Trading System under Costly Enforcement
    Jin, Shuai
    Zhang, Yanlin
    Sheng, Zhaohan
    MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS IN ENGINEERING, 2014, 2014
12345