Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable: A reply

被引：3

|

作者：

Krasa, S ^{[1
]}

Villamil, AP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Illinois, Dept Econ, Champaign, IL 61820 USA

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 2003年 / 71卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1468-0262.00404

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：391 / 393

页数：3

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