Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

被引：6
|
作者：
Hvide, Hans K. [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Leite, Tore E. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
[2] IZA, Bonn, Germany
[3] CEPR, London, England
[4] Univ Aberdeen, Sch Business, Aberdeen AB2A 3QY, Scotland
来源：
ECONOMIC THEORY | 2010年 / 44卷 / 01期
关键词：
Costly state verification; Debt contract; Priority violation; Strategic defaults; STATE VERIFICATION; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; COMMITMENT; RENEGOTIATION; MODEL;
D O I：
10.1007/s00199-009-0461-1
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider a financing game where monitoring is costly, non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. The optimal contract, which is debt, induces creditor leniency and strategic defaults on the equilibrium path, consistent with empirical evidence on repayment and monitoring behavior in credit markets. Our paper is the first where the optimal contract is debt and default is not synonymous with bankruptcy.
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页码：149 / 165
页数：17
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