OPTIMAL-CONTRACTS UNDER COSTLY STATE FALSIFICATION

被引：110

|

作者：

LACKER, JM ^{[1
]}

WEINBERG, JA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] PURDUE UNIV,W LAFAYETTE,IN 47907

来源：

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY | 1989年 / 97卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/261657

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：1345 / 1363

页数：19

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