Optimal debt contracts and the single-crossing condition

被引:3
|
作者
Faure-Grimaud, A
Mariotti, T [1 ]
机构
[1] LSE, Dept Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England
[2] CEPR, London, England
[3] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, London WC2A 2AE, England
关键词
debt contracts; single crossing condition;
D O I
10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00119-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We argue that standard results proving that debt contracts can be obtained as the solution of an ex post adverse selection problem are derived without borrowers' preferences satisfying a proper single crossing condition. For a simple example where this condition is restored, we show that the optimal financial contract is not a standard debt contract, but rather an option contract. This casts some doubts on the robustness of existing results. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:85 / 89
页数:5
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