Multiple large shareholders, agency problem, and firm innovation

被引：4

作者：

Li, Chen ^{[1
]}

Yan, Caiyu ^{[2
]}

Li, Juan ^{[3
]}

Xia, Chuanwen ^{[4
]}

Xiao, Yigui ^{[5
]}

Zheng, Ling ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Guilin Univ Technol, Sch Business, Guilin, Peoples R China

[2] Hunan Univ Technol & Business, Sch Accounting, Changsha, Peoples R China

[3] Hunan Univ Technol & Business, Off Acad Affairs, Changsha, Peoples R China

[4] Haikou Univ Econ, DZ Sch Accountancy, Haikou, Peoples R China

[5] Hunan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Business Adm, Changsha, Peoples R China

来源：

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS | 2024年 / 45卷 / 02期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; PAY GAP; STOCK; PERFORMANCE; PROTECTION; CONTESTS; COSTS;

D O I：

10.1002/mde.4032

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper, in the context of agency problem, examines the impacts of multiple large shareholders on firm innovation. A dataset of non-financial listed firms in China was established from 2007 to 2019. Innovation is divided into innovative quantity and innovative quality. The results demonstrate that multiple large shareholders can trigger innovative quantity and improve innovative quality. Multiple large shareholders restrict excessive earnings management and optimize pay gap by top manager to support innovation. It also finds that multiple large shareholders have a positive impact on firm's innovation through reducing share pledge and tunneling action of controlling shareholders. Moreover, it is also confirmed that better information environment and legal framework contribute to the positive effect of multiple large shareholders in corporate governance, along with firm innovation superior.

引用

页码：734 / 747

页数：14

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