Multiple large shareholders, agency problem, and firm innovation

被引：4
|
作者：
Li, Chen [1 ]
Yan, Caiyu [2 ]
Li, Juan [3 ]
Xia, Chuanwen [4 ]
Xiao, Yigui [5 ]
Zheng, Ling [2 ]
机构：
[1] Guilin Univ Technol, Sch Business, Guilin, Peoples R China
[2] Hunan Univ Technol & Business, Sch Accounting, Changsha, Peoples R China
[3] Hunan Univ Technol & Business, Off Acad Affairs, Changsha, Peoples R China
[4] Haikou Univ Econ, DZ Sch Accountancy, Haikou, Peoples R China
[5] Hunan Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Business Adm, Changsha, Peoples R China
来源：
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS | 2024年 / 45卷 / 02期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; PAY GAP; STOCK; PERFORMANCE; PROTECTION; CONTESTS; COSTS;
D O I：
10.1002/mde.4032
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper, in the context of agency problem, examines the impacts of multiple large shareholders on firm innovation. A dataset of non-financial listed firms in China was established from 2007 to 2019. Innovation is divided into innovative quantity and innovative quality. The results demonstrate that multiple large shareholders can trigger innovative quantity and improve innovative quality. Multiple large shareholders restrict excessive earnings management and optimize pay gap by top manager to support innovation. It also finds that multiple large shareholders have a positive impact on firm's innovation through reducing share pledge and tunneling action of controlling shareholders. Moreover, it is also confirmed that better information environment and legal framework contribute to the positive effect of multiple large shareholders in corporate governance, along with firm innovation superior.
引用
收藏
页码：734 / 747
页数：14
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Shareholder Protection: The Role of Multiple Large Shareholders
    Casado, Raul Barroso
    Burkert, Michael
    Davila, Antonio
    Oyon, Daniel
    CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 2016, 24 (02) : 105 - 129
  • [22] Multiple large shareholders and controlling shareholders' related-party M&As
    Shen, Yanyan
    Yang, Xiaotong
    Zhu, Bing
    APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2023, 30 (03) : 397 - 403
  • [23] Large shareholders and agency costs of debt. Evidence from Spain
    Alvarez-Botas, Celia
    Fernandez-Mendez, Carlos
    Gonzalez, Victor M.
    REVISTA DE CONTABILIDAD-SPANISH ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2024, 27 (01) : 92 - 109
  • [24] Large Shareholders, Shareholder Proposals, and Firm Performance: Evidence from Japan
    Yeh, Tsung-Ming
    CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 2014, 22 (04) : 312 - 329
  • [25] Nonfinancial companies as large shareholders alleviate financial constraints of Brazilian firm
    Crisostomo, Vicente Lima
    Javier Lopez-Iturriaga, Felix
    Vallelado Gonzalez, Eleuterio
    EMERGING MARKETS REVIEW, 2014, 18 : 62 - 77
  • [26] Do multiple large shareholders reduce agency problems in state-controlled listed firms? Evidence from China
    Chen, Fengqin
    Huyghebaert, Nancy
    Lin, Sen
    Wang, Lihong
    PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL, 2019, 57
  • [27] Multiple large shareholders and corporate social responsibility reporting
    Cao, Feng
    Peng, Songlan
    Ye, Kangtao
    EMERGING MARKETS REVIEW, 2019, 38 : 287 - 309
  • [28] Multiple Large Shareholders, Identity, and Corporate Tax Avoidance
    Huyghebaert, Nancy
    Kang, Shaoqing
    Wang, Lihong
    Wu, Wenfeng
    MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION REVIEW, 2024, 20 (02) : 235 - 264
  • [29] The Effect of Multiple Large Shareholders on Banks' Profitability and Risk
    Soana, Maria Gaia
    Barbieri, Laura
    Lippi, Andrea
    Rossi, Simone
    SUSTAINABILITY, 2021, 13 (04) : 1 - 15
  • [30] The Role of Multiple Large Shareholders in the Choice of Debt Source
    Boubaker, Sabri
    Rouatbi, Wael
    Saffar, Walid
    FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 2017, 46 (01) : 241 - 274
12345