CROP INSURANCE AND CROP PRODUCTION - AN EMPIRICAL-STUDY OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION

被引：87

作者：

QUIGGIN, J ^{[1
]}

KARAGIANNIS, G ^{[1
]}

STANTON, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV MARYLAND,DEPT AGR & RESOURCE ECON,COLL PK,MD 20742

来源：

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS | 1993年 / 37卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-8489.1993.tb00531.x

中图分类号：

F3 [农业经济];

学科分类号：

0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：95 / 113

页数：19

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