OVERINSURANCE AND PUBLIC PROVISION OF INSURANCE - ROLES OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION

被引：286
|
作者：
PAULY, MV [1 ]
机构：
[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201
来源：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1974年 / 88卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/1881793
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：44 / 62
页数：19
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