Firm's Strategic Responses in Standardization

被引：0
|
作者：
Nguyen Huu Phuc [1 ]
机构：
[1] Yamaguchi Univ, Grad Sch Innovat & Technol Management, 1677-1, Yoshida, Yamaguchi 7538511, Japan
来源：
RISUS-JOURNAL ON INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABILITY | 2014年 / 5卷 / 02期
关键词：
Standardization; Cross license; Patent pool; Game theory;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
From the perspective of game theory, this paper examines 1) Why do companies participate in standardization activities and patent pools, even if the activities benefit their rival companies; 2) When there are multiple standards of similar products, under what conditions will these multiple standards be replaced by a de facto standard, 3) When will these multiple standards coexist together? 4) What are the strategic responses of the companies then?
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页码：36 / 41
页数：6
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