OPTIMAL RETAIL CONTRACTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND MORAL HAZARD

被引：46
|
作者：
BLAIR, BF
LEWIS, TR
机构：
来源：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1994年 / 25卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2555831
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Constrained joint-profit-maximizing retail contracts are derived when the dealer is privately informed about demand conditions before contracting with the manufacturer. Demand is increased by dealer promotion, which is unobservable by the manufacturer. Consequently, the manufacturer does not know whether to attribute a low level of sales to a decline in demand or to a lack of promotion. We show that, in general, the optimal contract exhibits some form of resale price maintenance and quantity fixing. The type of resale price maintenance and quantity fixing depends on how price and quantity affect the link between sales and promotion.
引用
收藏
页码：284 / 296
页数：13
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] REPEATED INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND MORAL HAZARD
    RUBINSTEIN, A
    YAARI, ME
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1983, 30 (01) : 74 - 97
  • [32] Moral hazard and legal services contracts
    Graham B.J.
    Robles J.
    International Review of Economics, 2014, 61 (3) : 219 - 230
  • [33] IMPLICIT CONTRACTS, MORAL HAZARD, AND UNEMPLOYMENT
    GROSSMAN, SJ
    HART, OD
    AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1981, 71 (02): : 301 - 307
  • [34] OPTIMAL CONTRACTS IN ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITH RANDOM RESERVATION UTILITY LEVEL
    Marinescu, Daniela Elena
    Marin, Dumitru
    ECONOMIC COMPUTATION AND ECONOMIC CYBERNETICS STUDIES AND RESEARCH, 2012, 46 (03): : 25 - 40
  • [35] Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
    Auster, Sarah
    GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2013, 82 : 503 - 521
  • [36] MONITORING, MORAL HAZARD, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, AND RISK SHARING IN PROCUREMENT CONTRACTING
    BARON, DP
    BESANKO, D
    RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1987, 18 (04): : 509 - 532
  • [37] Supply chain moral hazard strategy under asymmetric information condition
    Zhu, Li-Long
    You, Jian-Xin
    Jisuanji Jicheng Zhizao Xitong/Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, CIMS, 2010, 16 (11): : 2503 - 2509
  • [38] Optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard: A continuous-time approach
    Sung, JY
    REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2005, 18 (03): : 1021 - 1073
  • [39] Double moral hazard, monitoring, and the nature of contracts
    Agrawal, P
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE, 2002, 75 (01): : 33 - 61
  • [40] Optimal retail contracts with contractible uncertainty
    Biggar, Darryl R.
    Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza
    ENERGY ECONOMICS, 2024, 136
12345