REPEATED INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND MORAL HAZARD

被引：115

|

作者：

RUBINSTEIN, A

YAARI, ME

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1983年 / 30卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(83)90094-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：74 / 97

页数：24

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