Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

被引：6
|
作者：
Nieken, Petra [1 ]
Schmitz, Patrick W. [2 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
[2] Univ Cologne, Dept Econ, D-50923 Cologne, Germany
[3] CEPR, London, England
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2012年 / 75卷 / 02期
关键词：
Repeated moral hazard; Sequential hidden actions; Laboratory experiment; LIMITED-LIABILITY; SHORT-TERM; LONG-TERM; AVERSION; AGENCY; COMMITMENT;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.011
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：1000 / 1008
页数：9
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