Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

被引：6

作者：

Nieken, Petra ^{[1
]}

Schmitz, Patrick W. ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bonn, Dept Econ, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

[2] Univ Cologne, Dept Econ, D-50923 Cologne, Germany

[3] CEPR, London, England

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2012年 / 75卷 / 02期

关键词：

Repeated moral hazard; Sequential hidden actions; Laboratory experiment; LIMITED-LIABILITY; SHORT-TERM; LONG-TERM; AVERSION; AGENCY; COMMITMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.011

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1000 / 1008

页数：9

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