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MORAL HAZARD AND INCENTIVES IN A DECENTRALIZED PLANNING ENVIRONMENT
被引:4
|
作者
:
LIU, PW
论文数:
0
引用数:
0
h-index:
0
机构:
HARVARD UNIV,HARVARD YENCHING INST,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
HARVARD UNIV,HARVARD YENCHING INST,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
LIU, PW
[
1
]
机构
:
[1]
HARVARD UNIV,HARVARD YENCHING INST,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
来源
:
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS
|
1986年
/ 10卷
/ 02期
关键词
:
D O I
:
10.1016/0147-5967(86)90123-X
中图分类号
:
F [经济];
学科分类号
:
02 ;
摘要
:
引用
收藏
页码:91 / 105
页数:15
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