MORAL HAZARD AND INCENTIVES IN A DECENTRALIZED PLANNING ENVIRONMENT

被引:4
|
作者
LIU, PW [1 ]
机构
[1] HARVARD UNIV,HARVARD YENCHING INST,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0147-5967(86)90123-X
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:91 / 105
页数:15
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