MORAL HAZARD WITH SEVERAL AGENTS - THE GAINS FROM COOPERATION

被引：33
|
作者：
MACHOSTADLER, I
PEREZCASTRILLO, JD
机构：
[1] UNIV AUTONOMA BARCELONA,DEPT ECON & HIST ECON,BARCELONA,SPAIN
[2] UNIV AUTONOMA BARCELONA,INST ANAL ECON,BARCELONA,SPAIN
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1993年 / 11卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0167-7187(93)90037-D
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider a situation in which a principal hires two agents whose cooperation is technically profitable and study three models that incorporate different assumptions about the agents' cooperative behavior. We find a close relationship between the agents' commitment capacity and the characteristics of the optimal contract. A greater capacity to cooperate leads to more efficient outcomes. We also show that, unless agents form a team, the efficient level of mutual help is not achieved in equilibrium.
引用
收藏
页码：73 / 100
页数：28
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