MORAL HAZARD WITH SEVERAL AGENTS - THE GAINS FROM COOPERATION

被引:33
|
作者
MACHOSTADLER, I
PEREZCASTRILLO, JD
机构
[1] UNIV AUTONOMA BARCELONA,DEPT ECON & HIST ECON,BARCELONA,SPAIN
[2] UNIV AUTONOMA BARCELONA,INST ANAL ECON,BARCELONA,SPAIN
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0167-7187(93)90037-D
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider a situation in which a principal hires two agents whose cooperation is technically profitable and study three models that incorporate different assumptions about the agents' cooperative behavior. We find a close relationship between the agents' commitment capacity and the characteristics of the optimal contract. A greater capacity to cooperate leads to more efficient outcomes. We also show that, unless agents form a team, the efficient level of mutual help is not achieved in equilibrium.
引用
收藏
页码:73 / 100
页数:28
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Moral hazard
    Higgins, ST
    NEW REPUBLIC, 2003, 228 (22) : 4 - 4
  • [22] Moral hazard
    Scoblic, JP
    NEW REPUBLIC, 2005, 233 (06) : 17 - 23
  • [23] 'Moral Hazard'
    Clancy, L
    OVERLAND, 2002, (169): : 139 - 142
  • [24] 'Moral Hazard'
    Stead, M
    TLS-THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, 2002, (5165): : 23 - 23
  • [25] Moral hazard
    Condon, B
    FORBES, 2005, 176 (09): : 58 - 58
  • [26] 'Moral Hazard'
    不详
    NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW, 2002, : 18 - 18
  • [27] A moral hazard
    Gimson, Sally
    INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, 2021, 50 (01) : 59 - 63
  • [28] Moral Turbulence and Geoengineering A Lingering Hazard from the Perfect Moral Storm
    Preston, Christopher J.
    PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC ISSUES, 2013, 3 (01): : 25 - 35
  • [29] Assessing the Gains from International Macroprudential Policy Cooperation
    Agenor, Pierre-Richard
    Jackson, Timothy
    Kharroubi, Enisse
    Gambacorta, Leonardo
    Lombardo, Giovanni
    Pereira da Silva, Luiz A.
    JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING, 2021, 53 (07) : 1819 - 1866
  • [30] Intelligence, Personality, and Gains from Cooperation in Repeated Interactions
    Proto, Eugenio
    Rustichini, Aldo
    Sofianos, Andis
    JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2019, 127 (03) : 1351 - 1390