MORAL HAZARD AND COOPERATION

被引：5

作者：

MACHOSTADLER, I ^{[1
]}

PEREZCASTRILLO, JD ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] ECOLE NORM SUPER, ECOLE HAUTES ETUD SCI SOCIALES, CNRS, F-75231 PARIS 05, FRANCE

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 35卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90097-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider a situation in which a principal hires two agents whose cooperation is profitable from a technical point of view. The characteristics of the optimal contract are strongly dependent on the agents' commitment capacity, that allows them to reach more efficient outcomes. © 1991.

引用

页码：17 / 20

页数：4

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