MORAL HAZARD AND COOPERATION

被引：5
|
作者：
MACHOSTADLER, I [1 ]
PEREZCASTRILLO, JD [1 ]
机构：
[1] ECOLE NORM SUPER, ECOLE HAUTES ETUD SCI SOCIALES, CNRS, F-75231 PARIS 05, FRANCE
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 35卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0165-1765(91)90097-5
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider a situation in which a principal hires two agents whose cooperation is profitable from a technical point of view. The characteristics of the optimal contract are strongly dependent on the agents' commitment capacity, that allows them to reach more efficient outcomes. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码：17 / 20
页数：4
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