Exact methods for combinatorial auctions

被引：0
|
作者：
Dries Goossens
机构：
[1] Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,Research center for Operations Research and Business Statistics
来源：
4OR | 2007年 / 5卷
关键词：
Combinatorial auction; Winner determination problem; Exact method; Complexity; 90C27; 91B26;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This is a summary of the author’s PhD thesis supervised by Frits Spieksma and defended on 20 December 2006 at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. The thesis is written in English and is available from the author’s website (http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/dries.goossens/public). This work deals with combinatorial auctions, i.e., auctions where bidders can bid on sets of items. We study two special cases, namely the total quantity discount auction and the matrix bid auction.
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页码：335 / 338
页数：3
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