Design issues for combinatorial auctions

被引：0
|
作者：
Abrache J. [1 ,3 ]
Crainic T.G. [2 ,3 ]
Gendreau M. [1 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Département d'informatique et de recherche opérationnelle, Université de Montréal, Montréal, H3C 3J7
[2] Département management et technologie, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, H3C 4R2, CP 6192, succursale Centre-ville
[3] Centre de recherche sur les transports, Université de Montréal, Montréal, H3C3J7, C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville
来源：
Quarterly Journal of the Belgian, French and Italian Operations Research Societies | 2004年 / 2卷 / 1期
基金：
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词：
Advisors; Bidding languages; Combinatorial auctions; E-commerce; Iterative auctions; Mechanism design;
D O I：
10.1007/s10288-004-0033-y
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions. For each issue, we survey the existing literature and propose avenues for further research. © Springer-Verlag 2004.
引用
收藏
页码：1 / 33
页数：32
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Item price information feedback in multiple unit combinatorial auctions: design issues
    Iftekhar, M. S.
    Hailu, A.
    Lindner, R. K.
    IMA JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT MATHEMATICS, 2011, 22 (03) : 271 - 289
  • [2] Combinatorial auctions for procuring agri-environmental services: a review of some design issues
    Iftekhar, S.
    Hailu, A.
    Lindner, B.
    AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, 2012, 19 (02) : 79 - 90
  • [3] Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions
    Fikioris, Giannis
    Fotakis, Dimitris
    THEORY OF COMPUTING SYSTEMS, 2022, 66 (04) : 778 - 801
  • [4] An Analysis of Design Problems in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions
    Martin Bichler
    Alexander Pikovsky
    Thomas Setzer
    Business & Information Systems Engineering, 2009, 1 : 111 - 117
  • [5] An analysis of design problems in combinatorial procurement auctions
    Bichler, M
    Pikovsky, A
    Setzer, T
    WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK, 2005, 47 (02): : 126 - 134
  • [6] An Analysis of Design Problems in Combinatorial Procurement Auctions
    Bichler, Martin
    Pikovsky, Alexander
    Setzer, Thomas
    BUSINESS & INFORMATION SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, 2009, 1 (01) : 111 - 117
  • [7] Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions
    Fikioris, Giannis
    Fotakis, Dimitris
    ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY, SAGT 2020, 2020, 12283 : 47 - 63
  • [8] Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions
    Giannis Fikioris
    Dimitris Fotakis
    Theory of Computing Systems, 2022, 66 : 778 - 801
  • [9] Design of combinatorial auctions for allocation and procurement process
    Schwind, M
    CEC 2005: SEVENTH IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON E-COMMERCE TECHNOLOGY, PROCEEDINGS, 2005, : 391 - 395
  • [10] Combinatorial auctions
    Jawad Abrache
    Teodor Gabriel Crainic
    Michel Gendreau
    Monia Rekik
    Annals of Operations Research, 2007, 153 : 131 - 164
12345