Design issues for combinatorial auctions

被引：0
|
作者：
Abrache J. [1 ,3 ]
Crainic T.G. [2 ,3 ]
Gendreau M. [1 ,3 ]
机构：
[1] Département d'informatique et de recherche opérationnelle, Université de Montréal, Montréal, H3C 3J7
[2] Département management et technologie, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, H3C 4R2, CP 6192, succursale Centre-ville
[3] Centre de recherche sur les transports, Université de Montréal, Montréal, H3C3J7, C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville
来源：
Quarterly Journal of the Belgian, French and Italian Operations Research Societies | 2004年 / 2卷 / 1期
基金：
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词：
Advisors; Bidding languages; Combinatorial auctions; E-commerce; Iterative auctions; Mechanism design;
D O I：
10.1007/s10288-004-0033-y
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Combinatorial auctions are an important class of market mechanisms in which participants are allowed to bid on bundles of multiple heterogeneous items. In this paper, we discuss several complex issues that are encountered in the design of combinatorial auctions. These issues are related to the formulation of the winner determination problem, the expression of combined bids, the design of progressive combinatorial auctions that require less information revelation, and the need for decision support tools to help participants make profitable bidding decisions. For each issue, we survey the existing literature and propose avenues for further research. © Springer-Verlag 2004.
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页码：1 / 33
页数：32
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