On Optimal Insurance in the Presence of Moral Hazard

被引：0
|
作者：
Edi Karni
机构：
[1] Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics
来源：
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review | 2008年 / 33卷
关键词：
moral hazard; agency theory; subjective probabilities;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper expounds on the importance of identifiabilty of subjective probabilities in agency theory with moral hazard. An application to insurance is examined.
引用
收藏
页码：1 / 18
页数：17
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