Accounting and stock price performance in dynamic CEO compensation arrangements

被引：47
|
作者：
Boschen, JF [1 ]
Duru, A
Gordon, LA
Smith, KJ
机构：
[1] Coll William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
[2] American Univ, Washington, DC 20016 USA
[3] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
来源：
ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2003年 / 78卷 / 01期
关键词：
executive compensation; stock price performance; accounting performance; dynamic models;
D O I：
10.2308/accr.2003.78.1.143
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
In this study we examine the long-run effects of unexpected firm performance on CEO compensation. We find that unexpectedly good accounting performance is initially associated with increases in CEO pay. However, this initial effect soon reverses, and is followed by lower CEO pay in later years. Overall, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good accounting performance is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, unexpectedly good stock price performance is associated with increases in CEO pay for several years. Thus, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good stock price performance is positive and significant.
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页码：143 / 168
页数：26
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