Accounting and stock price performance in dynamic CEO compensation arrangements

被引：47
|
作者：
Boschen, JF [1 ]
Duru, A
Gordon, LA
Smith, KJ
机构：
[1] Coll William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
[2] American Univ, Washington, DC 20016 USA
[3] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
来源：
ACCOUNTING REVIEW | 2003年 / 78卷 / 01期
关键词：
executive compensation; stock price performance; accounting performance; dynamic models;
D O I：
10.2308/accr.2003.78.1.143
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
In this study we examine the long-run effects of unexpected firm performance on CEO compensation. We find that unexpectedly good accounting performance is initially associated with increases in CEO pay. However, this initial effect soon reverses, and is followed by lower CEO pay in later years. Overall, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good accounting performance is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, unexpectedly good stock price performance is associated with increases in CEO pay for several years. Thus, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good stock price performance is positive and significant.
引用
收藏
页码：143 / 168
页数：26
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Accounting for Compensation in the Form of Stock Options
    Dohr, James L.
    JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, 1945, 80 (06): : 439 - 443
  • [22] Accounting for Compensation In the Form of Stock Options
    Broad, Samuel J.
    Aitken, John N.
    Bell, William H.
    Dalton, Homer L.
    Dickerson, Thomas M.
    Dohr, James L.
    Duncombe, Fred J.
    Friedman, J. P.
    Herrick, Anson
    Higgins, Thomas G.
    Himmelblau, David
    Inglis, John B.
    Knight, Paul K.
    Lindquist, John A.
    McDevitt, Edward J.
    Paton, William A.
    Peloubet, Maurice E.
    Schaffer, Walter L.
    Stans, Maurice H.
    Tilly, Virgil S.
    Wellington, C. Oliver
    Blough, Carman G.
    JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, 1949, 87 (01): : 38 - 41
  • [23] Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation
    Schroth, Josef
    JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2018, 56 (05) : 1335 - 1381
  • [24] CEO characteristics, accounting opacity and stock price synchronicity: Empirical evidence from German listed firms
    Neifar, Souhir
    Ajili, Hana
    JOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE, 2019, 30 (02): : 29 - 43
  • [25] The role of accounting in the design of CEO equity compensation
    Carter, Mary Ellen
    Lynch, Luann J.
    Tuna, Irem
    ACCOUNTING REVIEW, 2007, 82 (02): : 327 - 357
  • [26] ACCOUNTING FOR THE EXPLANATIONS OF CEO COMPENSATION - SUBSTANCE AND SYMBOLISM
    ZAJAC, EJ
    WESTPHAL, JD
    ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 1995, 40 (02) : 283 - 308
  • [27] Accounting Quality, Stock Price Delay, and Future Stock Returns
    Callen, Jeffrey L.
    Khan, Mozaffar
    Lu, Hai
    CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2013, 30 (01) : 269 - 295
  • [28] THE USE OF ACCOUNTING AND SECURITY PRICE MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE IN MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION CONTRACTS - A DISCUSSION
    LAMBERT, RA
    JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1993, 16 (1-3): : 101 - 123
  • [29] CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk
    Kim, Jeong-Bon
    Wang, Zheng
    Zhang, Liandong
    CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2016, 33 (04) : 1720 - 1749
  • [30] CEO centrality and stock price crash risk
    Krishnamurti, Chandrasekhar
    Chowdhury, Hasibul
    Han, Hien Duc
    JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL FINANCE, 2021, 31
12345