Independent director tenure;
Expertise hypothesis;
Management friendly hypothesis;
Firm transparency;
Information asymmetry;
Information environment;
FINANCIAL-REPORTING QUALITY;
AUDIT COMMITTEE;
PRICE INFORMATIVENESS;
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS;
INDUSTRY EXPERTISE;
INTERNAL CONTROL;
EARNINGS;
ASK;
DISCLOSURE;
LIQUIDITY;
D O I:
10.1016/j.najef.2021.101413
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
We examine the impact of independent director tenure on corporate transparency. Using a sample of 12,423 firm-year observations from 1997 to 2017, we find that corporate transparency increases in independent director tenure. The results are robust to various variable definitions and model specifications, providing strong evidence supporting the Expertise hypothesis that longtenured independent directors are better monitors and advisors. We conclude that long-tenured directors benefit firms and their investors by enhancing firm transparency and reducing information risk. Capping independent director tenure is not always beneficial.
机构:
Lincoln Univ, Fac Agribusiness & Commerce, Dept Financial & Business Syst, Christchurch, New ZealandLincoln Univ, Fac Agribusiness & Commerce, Dept Financial & Business Syst, Christchurch, New Zealand
Zaman, Rashid
Bahadar, Stephen
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机构:
Lincoln Univ, Fac Agribusiness & Commerce, Dept Financial & Business Syst, Christchurch, New ZealandLincoln Univ, Fac Agribusiness & Commerce, Dept Financial & Business Syst, Christchurch, New Zealand
Bahadar, Stephen
论文数: 引用数:
h-index:
机构:
Kayani, Umar Nawaz
Arslan, Muhammad
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Lincoln Univ, Fac Agribusiness & Commerce, Lincoln, New ZealandLincoln Univ, Fac Agribusiness & Commerce, Dept Financial & Business Syst, Christchurch, New Zealand
Arslan, Muhammad
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS IN SOCIETY,
2018,
18
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: 858
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885