Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: A model of the credit channel

被引：50
|
作者：
Repullo, R
Suarez, J
机构：
[1] CEMFI, Madrid 28014, Spain
[2] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London SW1Y 6LA, England
来源：
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2000年 / 44卷 / 10期
关键词：
monetary transmission mechanism; credit markets; bank monitoring; interest rate ceilings; capital requirements;
D O I：
10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00069-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper develops a model of the choice between bank and market finance by entrepreneurial firms that differ in the value of their net worth. The monitoring associated with bank finance ameliorates a moral hazard problem between the entrepreneurs and their lenders. The model is used to analyze the different strands of the credit view of the transmission of monetary policy. In particular, we derive the empirical implications of a broad credit channel, and compare them to those obtained when the model is extended to incorporate some elements of the bank lending channel. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: E44; E50; D82.
引用
收藏
页码：1931 / 1950
页数：20
相关论文
共 50 条
12345