STOCHASTIC MONITORING AND MORAL HAZARD

被引：20

|

作者：

KANODIA, CS

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH | 1985年 / 23卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2490913

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：175 / 193

页数：19

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