A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard

被引：6
|
作者：
Attar, Andrea
Piaser, Gwenael
Porteiro, Nicolas
机构：
[1] Univ Toulouse 1, IDEI, F-31042 Toulouse, France
[2] Univ Roma La Sapienza, I-00161 Rome, Italy
[3] Univ Ca Foscari Venezia, Venice, Italy
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2007年 / 95卷 / 02期
关键词：
menus; Common Agency;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2006.10.021
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider Common Agency games of moral hazard and we suggest that there is only a very weak support for the standard restriction to take-it or leave-it contracts. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：278 / 284
页数：7
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