A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard

被引：6

作者：

Attar, Andrea

Piaser, Gwenael

Porteiro, Nicolas

机构：

[1] Univ Toulouse 1, IDEI, F-31042 Toulouse, France

[2] Univ Roma La Sapienza, I-00161 Rome, Italy

[3] Univ Ca Foscari Venezia, Venice, Italy

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2007年 / 95卷 / 02期

关键词：

menus; Common Agency;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2006.10.021

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider Common Agency games of moral hazard and we suggest that there is only a very weak support for the standard restriction to take-it or leave-it contracts. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：278 / 284

页数：7

共 50 条

[31] MORAL HAZARD
MARSHALL, JM
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1976, 66 (05): : 880 - 890
[32] Moral hazard
Kellner, T
Coolidge, C
FORBES, 2005, 176 (06): : 50 - +
[33] Moral hazard
Higgins, ST
NEW REPUBLIC, 2003, 228 (22) : 4 - 4
[34] Moral hazard
Scoblic, JP
NEW REPUBLIC, 2005, 233 (06) : 17 - 23
[35] 'Moral Hazard'
Clancy, L
OVERLAND, 2002, (169): : 139 - 142
[36] 'Moral Hazard'
Stead, M
TLS-THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, 2002, (5165): : 23 - 23
[37] Moral hazard
Condon, B
FORBES, 2005, 176 (09): : 58 - 58
[38] 'Moral Hazard'
不详
NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW, 2002, : 18 - 18
[39] A moral hazard
Gimson, Sally
INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, 2021, 50 (01) : 59 - 63
[40] Monetary politics in a monetary union: A note on common agency with rational expectations
Ruta, Michele
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2008, 101 (03) : 196 - 198

← 1 2 3 4 5 →