Non-CEO top managers' monitoring power and CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises: Evidence from Chinese state-owned listed firms

被引：10

作者：

Lei, Qianhua ^{[1
]}

Lu, Rui ^{[2
]}

Ren, Liuyang ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] South China Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China

[2] Sun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China

来源：

CHINA JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH | 2019年 / 12卷 / 04期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Inside directors; State-owned enterprises; Non-CEO top managers; Pay-performance sensitivity; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AGENCY COSTS; COMPENSATION; DIRECTORS; OWNERSHIP; DETERMINANTS; INCENTIVES; FINANCE; MARKET;

D O I：

10.1016/j.cjar.2019.10.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Few studies have focused on the role of non-CEO top manager inside directors in corporate governance, especially in the context of emerging countries. Despite their tendency to be subject to CEOs, non-CEO top manager inside directors can counterbalance CEOs in specific situations. Using panel data on state-owned listed companies in China, we conduct an empirical study of how non-CEO top manager inside directors influence CEO pay-performance sensitivity under serious agency conflicts. We find that the proportion of non-CEO top manager inside directors is significantly negatively correlated with CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises, whereas the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholders weakens this relationship. Furthermore, we find that non-CEO top manager inside directors significantly increase executives' on-the-job consumption. Our conclusions are robust to endogeneity testing and alternative specifications. (C) 2019 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页码：411 / 430

页数：20

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