Non-CEO top managers' monitoring power and CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises: Evidence from Chinese state-owned listed firms

被引：10

作者：

Lei, Qianhua ^{[1
]}

Lu, Rui ^{[2
]}

Ren, Liuyang ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] South China Univ Technol, Sch Business Adm, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China

[2] Sun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China

来源：

CHINA JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH | 2019年 / 12卷 / 04期

基金：

中国国家自然科学基金;

关键词：

Inside directors; State-owned enterprises; Non-CEO top managers; Pay-performance sensitivity; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; AGENCY COSTS; COMPENSATION; DIRECTORS; OWNERSHIP; DETERMINANTS; INCENTIVES; FINANCE; MARKET;

D O I：

10.1016/j.cjar.2019.10.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Few studies have focused on the role of non-CEO top manager inside directors in corporate governance, especially in the context of emerging countries. Despite their tendency to be subject to CEOs, non-CEO top manager inside directors can counterbalance CEOs in specific situations. Using panel data on state-owned listed companies in China, we conduct an empirical study of how non-CEO top manager inside directors influence CEO pay-performance sensitivity under serious agency conflicts. We find that the proportion of non-CEO top manager inside directors is significantly negatively correlated with CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises, whereas the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholders weakens this relationship. Furthermore, we find that non-CEO top manager inside directors significantly increase executives' on-the-job consumption. Our conclusions are robust to endogeneity testing and alternative specifications. (C) 2019 Sun Yat-sen University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页码：411 / 430

页数：20

共 50 条

[21] Incentives for CEOs with multitasks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises
Bai, CE
Xu, LXC
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS, 2005, 33 (03) : 517 - 539
[22] The Impact of CEO Duality and Financial Performance on CSR Disclosure: Empirical Evidence from State-Owned Enterprises in China
Voinea, Cosmina L.
Rauf, Fawad
Naveed, Khwaja
Fratostiteanu, Cosmin
JOURNAL OF RISK AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 2022, 15 (01)
[23] A Research on Efforts of Chinese State-owned Enterprises' Managers to Pollution Control
Xie Guanghua
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 6TH EURO-ASIA CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND CSR: TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE SESSION, PT II, 2010, : 185 - 190
[24] Financial Performance of State-owned Enterprises Listed as a Whole: An Empirical Analysis
Guo, Jian-qiang
Zhang, Pei
Qiu, Rui-qi
3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT (ICEM 2016), 2016, : 226 - 230
[25] Non-Controlling Shareholders and Innovation: Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises
Huang, Dan
Lu, Dong
Quan, Xiaofeng
Xing, Cunyu
EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE, 2023, 59 (01) : 39 - 59
[26] Top management turnover, firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises
Hu, Fang
Leung, Sidney C. M.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, 2012, 47 (02): : 235 - 262
[27] Sources of occupational stress from Chinese managers: A comparision of state-owned and private enterprises
Shu, XB
Liao, JQ
Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering, 2005, : 483 - 489
[28] The effects of the average characteristics of CEO and TMT on corporate performance: Evidence from state-owned, private and transnational firms in China
Sun, HF
MULTINATIONALS IN CHINA: COMPETITION AND COOPERATION, 2004, : 385 - 392
[29] Do state-owned participation shareholders improve the environmental governance level of private enterprises? Evidence from Chinese listed firms
Zou, Ling
Ma, Jiejing
FRONTIERS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, 2023, 11
[30] Mixed ownership and financial investment: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises
Wang, Hua
Wang, Wei
Alhaleh, Shadi Emad Areef
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY, 2021, 70 : 159 - 171

← 1 2 3 4 5 →