AN OPTIMAL STRONG EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION FOR COOPERATIVE MULTI-LEADER-FOLLOWER STACKELBERG MARKOV CHAINS GAMES

被引:20
|
作者
Trejo, K. K. [1 ]
Clempner, J. B. [2 ]
Poznyak, A. S. [1 ]
机构
[1] Ctr Res & Adv Studies, Dept Automat Control, Ave IPN 2508, Mexico City 07360, DF, Mexico
[2] Inst Politecn Nacl, Ctr Invest Econ Adm & Sociales, Lauro Aguirre 120, Mexico City 11360, DF, Mexico
关键词
strong equilibrium; Stackelberg and Nash; L-p-norm; Markov chains; BILEVEL MODEL; OPTIMIZATION; SECURITY; DISCRETE;
D O I
10.14736/kyb-2016-2-0258
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
This paper presents a novel approach for computing the strong Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games. For solving the cooperative n-leaders and m-followers Markov game we consider the minimization of the L-p-norm that reduces the distance to the utopian point in the Euclidian space. Then, we reduce the optimization problem to find a Pareto optimal solution. We employ a bi-level programming method implemented by the extraproximal optimization approach for computing the strong L-p-Stackelberg/Nash equilibrium. We validate the proposed method theoretically and by a numerical experiment related to marketing strategies for supermarkets.
引用
收藏
页码:258 / 279
页数:22
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