Truth and multiple realizability

被引:57
|
作者
Lynch, MP [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1080/713659875
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this proposition faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
引用
收藏
页码:384 / 408
页数:25
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