Truth and multiple realizability

被引：57
|
作者：
Lynch, MP [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269 USA
来源：
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2004年 / 82卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1080/713659875
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this proposition faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
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页码：384 / 408
页数：25
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