Game Analysis on the Double Principal-Agent Risk in Risk Investment

被引:0
|
作者
Yang, Jinting [1 ]
Sun, Zilai [2 ]
Liu, Yinghui [2 ]
机构
[1] Handan Coll, Handan, Peoples R China
[2] Hebei Univ Engn, Coll Econ & Management, Handan, Peoples R China
关键词
Double Principal-agent risk; Adverse selection; Moral hazard; Game analysis; Risk investment;
D O I
10.1109/KESE.2009.49
中图分类号
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要
In the risk investment system, whether the double principal-agent relationship which is formed by different interest subjects can smoothly operate is the key to determine the success of risk investment, yet the issue of information asymmetry in the field is more serious than other industry, so that double principal - agent relationship formed in it exists huge risks. A series of binding agreements and institutional arrangements can be reached among different interest subjects and strictly observed by all game parties, then this cooperative game can make the parties have sustained and stable income, and reached the win-win cooperation of game with incomplete information, so as to effectively restrain the double principal-agent risk.
引用
收藏
页码:159 / +
页数:2
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [31] The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference
    Xu, Dongsheng
    Liu, Qingqing
    Jiang, Xin
    AIMS MATHEMATICS, 2021, 6 (03): : 2171 - 2195
  • [32] Robust reinsurance and investment strategies under principal-agent framework
    Wang, Ning
    Siu, Tak Kuen
    Fan, Kun
    ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2024, 336 (1-2) : 981 - 1011
  • [33] Principal-agent relationship between urban and rural infrastructure investment
    Song, Jianhua
    JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY MATHEMATICS, 2018, 21 (04) : 929 - 939
  • [34] A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game
    Van Long, Ngo
    Sorger, Gerhard
    CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2010, 18 (04) : 491 - 509
  • [35] Construction process cost game based on principal-agent model
    Wang X.-M.
    Xiong J.-J.
    Su Q.-L.
    Kongzhi yu Juece/Control and Decision, 2019, 34 (02): : 390 - 394
  • [36] A dynamic principal-agent problem as a feedback Stackelberg differential game
    Ngo Van Long
    Gerhard Sorger
    Central European Journal of Operations Research, 2010, 18 : 491 - 509
  • [37] Concluding Early Agreements in the EU: A Double Principal-Agent Analysis of Trilogue Negotiations
    Delreux, Tom
    Laloux, Thomas
    JCMS-JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 2018, 56 (02) : 300 - 317
  • [38] Research on Principal-agent Risk Prevention Based on Asymmetric Information for Venture Capital
    Bo, Wang
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RISK MANAGEMENT & ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOLS 1 AND 2, 2008, : 183 - 186
  • [39] A principal-agent model for hazmat transportation in China with risk perception and regulatory policy
    Li, Yuanyuan
    Ba, Yile
    Ng, C. T.
    Wu, Jun
    Yuan, Wenyan
    Li, Jian
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT LOGISTICS, 2023, 17 (1-2) : 1 - 20
  • [40] Analysis on Stakeholders' Rights Symmetry and Risk Formation of SMEs Innovation-based on the Principal-Agent Theory
    Wu, Jun-jie
    2011 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONICS, COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL (ICECC), 2011, : 3113 - 3116