Principal-agent relationship between urban and rural infrastructure investment

被引:0
|
作者
Song, Jianhua [1 ]
机构
[1] Beijing Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100044, Peoples R China
关键词
Urban and rural infrastructure investment; Principal-agent; Game equilibrium; Mixed strategy;
D O I
10.1080/09720502.2018.1475070
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship between urban and rural infrastructure investment. The government and urban-rural operator's response function was constructed respectively before the signing of the contract. On this basis, a dynamic game model and a static game model between government and urbanrural operator were constructed. This paper constructs the revenue function of government and urban and rural operators after the contract was signed. On the basis of this, a revenue matrix model of the game between the government and the urban-rural operator is constructed, and the Nash equilibrium solution under the hybrid strategy is obtained. Based on the analysis of the game relationship between the government and operators of urban and rural areas, this paper constructs the safeguard measures based on the integrated urban and rural infrastructure management mode of urban and rural operators.
引用
收藏
页码:929 / 939
页数:11
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