Heterogeneity in the Effect of Managerial Equity Incentives on Firm Value

被引：6
|
作者：
Benson, Bradley W. [1 ]
James, Hui L. [2 ]
Park, Jung Chul [3 ]
机构：
[1] Ball State Univ, Muncie, IN 47306 USA
[2] Univ Texas Tyler, Tyler, TX 75799 USA
[3] Univ S Florida, Tampa, FL 33620 USA
来源：
FINANCIAL REVIEW | 2019年 / 54卷 / 03期
关键词：
executive compensation; managerial equity incentives; firm value; SOX; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT; INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET; STOCK OPTION PORTFOLIOS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE; INSIDER OWNERSHIP; FAMILY OWNERSHIP; MARKET VALUATION;
D O I：
10.1111/fire.12185
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
We document significant heterogeneity in the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives and firm value using quantile regression. We show that CEO delta is more effective in the presence of ample investment opportunities, while CEO vega is more beneficial for firms lacking investment opportunities. Further, Tobin's Q increases in CEO delta for more risk-tolerant firms but increases in CEO vega for more risk-averse firms. We also observe that higher monitoring intensity after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reduces CEO delta's role in compensation. Risk aversion alters the optimal incentive-value relation, and the nature of this relation also depends on the level of Tobin's Q.
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页码：583 / 638
页数：56
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