Generalized Minimax: A Self-Enforcing Pricing Scheme for Load Aggregators

被引:9
|
作者
Sedzro, Kwami Senam [1 ]
Lamadrid, Alberto J. [2 ]
Chuah, Mooi Choo [3 ]
机构
[1] Lehigh Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA
[2] Lehigh Univ, Coll Business & Econ, Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA
[3] Lehigh Univ, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA
关键词
Retail electricity pricing; demand response; stochastic generation; DEMAND RESPONSE; ELECTRICITY; STRATEGIES;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2016.2602870
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
This paper introduces a novel electricity retail pricing scheme we designate generalized minimax (GenMinimax). GenMinimax is characterized by three rate zones with the narrowest in the middle, called threshold band, constituting the attraction zone where the lowest rate is charged. The scheme is designed so that the threshold band envelops a negotiated reference consumption profile. We consider a cooperative group of customers pooling together their flexible loads and participating in the energy market via an aggregator. The aggregator computes an optimal daily profile taking into account the gross daily demand from the consumer group and the energy market's expected conditions and opportunities, and assigns prices and rate zones accordingly. The consumer group reacts by deferring and curtailing the flexible loads in order to minimize their daily cost consisting of the energy bill, the utility cost, and the curtailment reward. We model the consumers' response and interaction with the aggregator as a two-stage sequential optimization problem. We perform sensitivity analysis over the most significant parameter combinations through two scenarios and five cases. We compare the performance of our scheme to that of time-of-use (TOU) and real time pricing (RTP). Using a 40-home aggregate energy profile, we show that consumers can match a test supply profile with 5% maximum error and 2% average error while TOU and RTP can lead, respectively, to 163% and 97% maximum error, and 37% and 25% average error.
引用
收藏
页码:1953 / 1963
页数:11
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Redux
    Thomas, Jonathan
    Worrall, Tim
    JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 2023, 179 (3-4): : 441 - 469
  • [42] A self-enforcing model of corporate law
    Black, B
    Kraakman, R
    HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 1996, 109 (08) : 1911 - 1982
  • [43] Self-enforcing capital tax coordination
    Eichner T.
    Pethig R.
    Journal of Business Economics, 2018, 88 (7-8) : 915 - 940
  • [44] HUMAN-CAPITAL AND SELF-ENFORCING CONTRACTS
    AZARIADIS, C
    SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1988, 90 (04): : 507 - 528
  • [45] Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited
    Rubio, SJ
    Ulph, A
    OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 2006, 58 (02): : 233 - 263
  • [46] Self-enforcing cooperation via strategic investment
    Moulin, H.
    Seth, A.
    Taub, B.
    ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN, 2020, 8 (01) : 1 - 11
  • [47] Self-enforcing transactions: Reciprocal exposure in fisheries
    Koss, P
    JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 1999, 15 (03): : 737 - 749
  • [48] Self-organized Learning by Self-Enforcing Networks
    Kluever, Christina
    Kluever, Juergen
    ADVANCES IN COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, PT I, 2013, 7902 : 518 - 529
  • [49] Self-enforcing climate-change treaties
    Dutta, PK
    Radner, R
    PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2004, 101 (14) : 5174 - 5179
  • [50] Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning
    Catonini, Emiliano
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2021, 88 (02): : 610 - 642