Generalized Minimax: A Self-Enforcing Pricing Scheme for Load Aggregators

被引:9
|
作者
Sedzro, Kwami Senam [1 ]
Lamadrid, Alberto J. [2 ]
Chuah, Mooi Choo [3 ]
机构
[1] Lehigh Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA
[2] Lehigh Univ, Coll Business & Econ, Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA
[3] Lehigh Univ, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA
关键词
Retail electricity pricing; demand response; stochastic generation; DEMAND RESPONSE; ELECTRICITY; STRATEGIES;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2016.2602870
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
This paper introduces a novel electricity retail pricing scheme we designate generalized minimax (GenMinimax). GenMinimax is characterized by three rate zones with the narrowest in the middle, called threshold band, constituting the attraction zone where the lowest rate is charged. The scheme is designed so that the threshold band envelops a negotiated reference consumption profile. We consider a cooperative group of customers pooling together their flexible loads and participating in the energy market via an aggregator. The aggregator computes an optimal daily profile taking into account the gross daily demand from the consumer group and the energy market's expected conditions and opportunities, and assigns prices and rate zones accordingly. The consumer group reacts by deferring and curtailing the flexible loads in order to minimize their daily cost consisting of the energy bill, the utility cost, and the curtailment reward. We model the consumers' response and interaction with the aggregator as a two-stage sequential optimization problem. We perform sensitivity analysis over the most significant parameter combinations through two scenarios and five cases. We compare the performance of our scheme to that of time-of-use (TOU) and real time pricing (RTP). Using a 40-home aggregate energy profile, we show that consumers can match a test supply profile with 5% maximum error and 2% average error while TOU and RTP can lead, respectively, to 163% and 97% maximum error, and 37% and 25% average error.
引用
收藏
页码:1953 / 1963
页数:11
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [21] Self-enforcing voting in international organizations
    Maggi, Giovanni
    Morelli, Massimo
    AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2006, 96 (04): : 1137 - 1158
  • [22] Self-enforcing trade agreements and lobbying
    Buzard, Kristy
    JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 2017, 108 : 226 - 242
  • [23] SELF-ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
    BARRETT, S
    OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 1994, 46 : 878 - 894
  • [24] Constitutions as self-enforcing redistributive schemes
    Filipovich D.
    Sempere J.
    Economics of Governance, 2008, 9 (2) : 103 - 129
  • [25] Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation
    Karl Jandoc
    Ruben Juarez
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, 46 : 327 - 355
  • [26] COMPLIANCE TECHNOLOGY AND SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS
    Harstad, Bard
    Lancia, Francesco
    Russo, Alessia
    JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2019, 17 (01) : 1 - 29
  • [27] Self-enforcing strategic demand reduction
    Reitsma, PSA
    Stone, P
    Csirik, JA
    Littman, ML
    AGENT-MEDIATED ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: DESIGNING MECHANISMS AND SYSTEMS, 2002, 2531 : 289 - 306
  • [28] Self-enforcing Private Inference Control
    Yang, Yanjiang
    Li, Yingjiu
    Weng, Jian
    Zhou, Jianying
    Bao, Feng
    PROVABLE SECURITY, PROCEEDINGS, 2009, 5848 : 260 - +
  • [29] The time structure of self-enforcing agreements
    Ray, D
    ECONOMETRICA, 2002, 70 (02) : 547 - 582
  • [30] Data Collection with Self-Enforcing Privacy
    Golle, Philippe
    McSherry, Frank
    Mironov, Ilya
    ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION AND SYSTEM SECURITY, 2008, 12 (02)