In whenever a truly patentable idea has been generated. Firms have a short-run incentive to deviate and receive additional rents from unworthy pending patents, as well as potential rents from PTO mistakes in granting patents. We provide conditions for reputation to be preserved in equilibrium and analyze which market environments are favorable for such an equilibrium to exist. In particular, we analyze the merits of different patent systems. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.
机构:
Univ Houston Victoria, Sch Business, 22400 Grand Cir Blvd, Katy, TX 77449 USAUniv Houston Victoria, Sch Business, 22400 Grand Cir Blvd, Katy, TX 77449 USA
Moghaddam, Kaveh
Weber, Thomas
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Univ Southern Indiana, Romain Coll Business, 8600 Univ Blvd, Evansville, IN 47712 USAUniv Houston Victoria, Sch Business, 22400 Grand Cir Blvd, Katy, TX 77449 USA
Weber, Thomas
Seifzadeh, Pouya
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SUNY Coll Geneseo, Sch Business, 1 Coll Circle, Geneseo, NY 14454 USAUniv Houston Victoria, Sch Business, 22400 Grand Cir Blvd, Katy, TX 77449 USA
Seifzadeh, Pouya
Azarpanah, Sara
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Lone Star Coll Houston North, 250 N Sam Houston Pkwy E, Houston, TX 77060 USAUniv Houston Victoria, Sch Business, 22400 Grand Cir Blvd, Katy, TX 77449 USA