Funding advantage and market discipline in the Canadian banking sector

被引:22
|
作者
Beyhaghi, Mehdi [1 ]
D'Souza, Chris [2 ]
Roberts, Gordon S. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas San Antonio, Coll Business, San Antonio, TX 78249 USA
[2] Bank Canada, Ottawa, ON K1A 0G9, Canada
[3] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, 4700 Keele St, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
关键词
Bail-in; Contingent capital; Market discipline; Funding advantage; Subordinated debt; Financial regulation; Bank resolution; SUBORDINATED DEBT; RISK; YIELDS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.08.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We employ a comprehensive data set and a variety of methods to provide evidence on the magnitude of large banks' funding advantage in Canada in addition to the extent to which market discipline exists across different securities issued by the Canadian banks. The banking sector in Canada provides a unique setting in which to examine market discipline along with the prospects of proposed reforms because Canada has no history of government bailouts, and an implicit government guarantee has been in effect consistently since the 1920s. We find that large banks have a funding advantage over small banks after controlling for bank-specific and market risk factors. Large banks on average pay 80 basis points and 70 basis points less, respectively, on their deposits and subordinated debt. Working with hand-collected market data on debt issues by large banks, we also find that market discipline exists for subordinated debt and not for senior debt. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:396 / 410
页数:15
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