Market discipline in the banking industry: evidence from spread dispersion

被引:10
|
作者
Iannotta, Giuliano [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] CAREFIN, Dept Finance, I-20136 Milan, Italy
[2] Univ Bocconi, I-20136 Milan, Italy
来源
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2011年 / 17卷 / 02期
关键词
banks; market discipline; opaqueness; credit ratings; SUBORDINATED DEBT; RISK; ISSUES; PRICE;
D O I
10.1080/13518471003638625
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Do bond investors price hidden information? To address this question, we use a heteroscedastic regression model to empirically examine the factors affecting the spread dispersion unexplained by easy-to-observe issue characteristics (such as credit ratings, size, maturity, etc.). Two main results emerge from the empirical analysis. First, variables that accurately predict the spread of the typical bond lose their explanatory power for worse-rated, subordinated bonds with longer maturity and smaller face value. This result suggests that investors price hidden information. Secondly, unexplained spread dispersion increases for open-priced offers and decreases with the number of banks involved in the syndicate, indicating that primary market characteristics affect the investors' ability to uncover hidden information.
引用
收藏
页码:111 / 131
页数:21
相关论文
共 50 条