The selection of contracts in supply chains: An empirical analysis

被引:71
|
作者
Sluis, Stephan [1 ]
De Giovanni, Pietro [2 ]
机构
[1] VU Amsterdam Univ, Dept Informat Logist & Innovat, Av Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] ESSEC Business Sch, Operat Management Dept, Ave Bernard Hirsch,BP 105, F-95021 Paris, France
基金
英国工程与自然科学研究理事会;
关键词
Supply chain coordination; Contracts; Performance; Supply chain orientation; Supply chain integration; Multiple logistic regression; Multinomial logistic regression; REVENUE-SHARING CONTRACTS; DEMAND DISRUPTIONS; COORDINATION; PERFORMANCE; ORIENTATION; INCENTIVES; MANAGEMENT; COST;
D O I
10.1016/j.jom.2015.10.002
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
This paper seeks to empirically identify the key drivers for firms in selecting a contract in a supply chain by investigating their performance, supply chain orientation, and supply chain integration. A conceptual model is drawn up based on the existing literature in supply chain coordination contracts, performance, supply chain orientation, and supply chain integration and tested on a large sample of European firms. Multiple and multinomial logistic regression models allow for estimating the relationships between these variables. Our results demonstrate that the selection of contracts and the probability of their adoption depend on several combinations of firms' performance, supply chain orientation, and integration. Overall, the research provides an empirical contribution to the literature on coordination with contracts, which turns out to be mainly game theory based. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 11
页数:11
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Participation of suppliers in greening supply chains: An empirical analysis of German automotive suppliers
    Caniels, Marjolein C. J.
    Gehrsitz, Matthias H.
    Semeijn, Janjaap
    JOURNAL OF PURCHASING AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT, 2013, 19 (03) : 134 - 143
  • [42] Causes of Supply Chain Disruptions: An Empirical Analysis in Cold Chains for Food and Pharmaceuticals
    Solomon, Marius M.
    INTERFACES, 2016, 46 (02) : 200 - 201
  • [43] Information sharing in supply chains, myth or reality? A critical analysis of empirical literature
    Kembro, Joakim
    Naeslund, Dag
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHYSICAL DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT, 2014, 44 (03) : 179 - 200
  • [44] Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: Linear contracts and double moral hazard
    Corbett, CJ
    DeCroix, GA
    Ha, AY
    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2005, 163 (03) : 653 - 667
  • [45] *.chain: automatic coding of smart contracts and user interfaces for supply chains
    Bistarelli, Stefano
    Faloci, Francesco
    Mori, Paolo
    2021 THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BLOCKCHAIN COMPUTING AND APPLICATIONS (BCCA), 2021, : 164 - 171
  • [46] Improving Farmers' Participation in Agri Supply Chains with Blockchain and Smart Contracts
    Kumarathunga, Malni
    2020 SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOFTWARE DEFINED SYSTEMS (SDS), 2020, : 139 - 144
  • [47] Group Warranty Contracts to Coordinate Assembly Supply Chains With Nontestable Components
    Duenyas, Izak
    Iravani, Seyed M. R.
    Li, Linlin
    Najafi, Sajjad
    PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, 2024, 33 (02) : 475 - 493
  • [48] The Evolution of Fresh Produce Supply Chains: From Spot Markets to Contracts
    Maruyama, Masayoshi
    Hirogaki, Mitsunori
    INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF RETAIL DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMER RESEARCH, 2007, 17 (04): : 359 - 376
  • [49] A coordination theoretic model for three level supply chains using contracts
    Arun Arshinder
    S. G. Kanda
    Sadhana, 2009, 34 : 767 - 798
  • [50] Coordination contracts for reverse supply chains: a state-of-the-art review
    Krapp M.
    Kraus J.B.
    Journal of Business Economics, 2019, 89 (7) : 747 - 792